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Abstract On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we in-
troduce path monotonicity, a property closely related to fairness (van den Brink,
2001). The principle of fairness states that if a game changes by adding another
game in which two players are symmetric, then their payoffs change by the same
amount. Under efficiency, path monotonicity is a relaxation of fairness that guar-
antees that when the worth of the grand coalition varies, the players’ payoffs
change according to some monotone path. In this paper, together with the stan-
dard properties of projection consistency (Funaki, 1998) and covariance, we show
that path monotonicity characterizes the weighted surplus division solutions. In-
terestingly, replacing projection consistency by either self consistency (Hart and
Mas-Colell, 1989) or max consistency (Davis and Maschler, 1965) we obtain new
axiomatic characterizations of the weighted Shapley values and the prenucleolus,
respectively. Finally, by the duality approach we provide a new axiomatization of
the weighted egalitarian non-separable contribution solutions using complement
consistency (Moulin, 1985).
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1 Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility (hereafter game) describes a situation
in which a society or community can profit from joint efforts. It consists of a finite
set of players and a real-valued function defined on the set of coalitions of players.
Assuming that the grand coalition will form, the question is how to allocate the
gains from cooperation among the players. A single-valued solution (or rule) is
a mapping that assigns to each game a feasible payoff vector, being one of the
objectives of the axiomatic method to identify a solution by a set of appealing
properties.
Probably, the most relevant single-valued solution is the Shapley value (Shap-
ley, 1953b) which considers that players should be paid only according to their
marginal contributions to all coalitions. In front of this marginality principle, the
equal surplus division solution (Driessen and Funaki, 1991)1 relies on egalitarian
considerations: it assigns to every player what they can achieve for themselves
alone, and distributes equally what is left of the gains of cooperation. Both so-
lutions satisfy equal treatment of equals. This property states that if two players
have equal contributions to all coalitions, they must receive the same payoff. Nev-
ertheless, in many applications, and because of external features of the players, the
assumption that every player has the same abilities may not be appropriated. The
weighted Shapley values (Shapley, 1953a) and the weighted surplus division solu-
tions (Calleja and Llerena, 2016) take care of this aspect by assigning exogenously
each player to a strictly positive weight, representing such abilities. A different
prominent rule is the prenucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) that takes specially care of
minimizing complaints of coalitions to a particular allocation.
In this paper, we consider the problem of axiomatizing the weighted surplus
division solution on the domain of all games. Despite the equal surplus division
solution has recently been characterized,2 as far as we know, there is no proper
axiomatic characterization of its non-symmetric generalization. Interestingly, our
results show that, although the definitions of the weighted surplus division solu-
tions, the weighted Shapley values and the prenucleolus differ completely, from an
axiomatic approach the difference can be pointed out to one axiom: consistency,
an outstanding relational property in the axiomatic method.3
Together with projection consistency (Funaki, 1998), Theorem 1 (i) charac-
terizes the family of the weighted surplus division solutions by means of the
well established property of covariance and path monotonicity, a sort of aggregate
monotonicity (Megiddo, 1974) that distributes any variation in the worth of the
grand coalition following a fixed pattern reflecting some exogenous circumstances
or priorities among players that are not captured by the characteristic function of
the game. From a different angle, and under efficiency, path monotonicity can be
1 This solution is also known as the center-of-gravity of the imputation set.
2 See, for instance, van den Brink (2007), Chun and Park (2012), Casajus and Huettner
(2014), Béal at al. (2015), Calleja and Llerena (2016) or van den Brink et al. (2016).
3 See Thomson (2011) and Thomson (2012) for essays on the consistency principle.
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viewed as a relaxation of two equivalent properties (on the full domain of games):
fairness, due to van den Brink (2001) and inspired in the notion of fairness as
introduced in Myerson (1977), and differential marginality (Casajus, 2011). Fair-
ness (marginality) guarantees that if we add a game to another game in which
two players are symmetric then, since their marginal contributions to coalitions
containing neither of them coincide in both games, the players’ payoffs change by
the same amount. Not surprisingly, fairness, together with the standard property
of efficiency, imply path monotonicity. Outstandingly, replacing projection consis-
tency in Theorem 1 (i) by either self consistency (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989) or by
max consistency (Davis and Maschler, 1965) and considering path monotonicity for
two-person games only, we obtain new axiomatic characterizations of the family
of weighted Shapley values (Theorem 1 (ii)) and the prenucleolus (Theorem 2).
All these characterization results are collected in Section 3.
In Section 4 we observe that substituting path monotonicity in Theorem 1 by
fairness allows to get new axiomatic characterizations of the equal surplus division
solution (Theorem 3 (i)) and the Shapley value (Theorem 3 (ii)). Furthermore, the
notion of duality in coalitional games (see, for instance, Oishi et al., 2016) leads
to a new axiomatic characterization of the egalitarian non-separable contribution
solution (Moulin, 1985) (Theorem 3 (iii)).4 Finally, replacing path monotonicity
by fairness (for two-person games) in Theorem 2, we obtain a new characterization
of the prenucleolus (Theorem 4).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce
some preliminaries on games. In Section 5 we introduce the dual property of path
monotonicity in order to provide, together with complement consistency (Moulin,
1985) and covariance, an axiomatic characterization of the family of weighted
egalitarian non-separable contribution solutions (Theorem 7). We conclude with
some remarks for future research and comparing our results with the character-
izations provided in Sobolev (1975), Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), Orshan (1993)
and Driessen and Funaki (1997). The Appendix contains the independence of the
properties in the characterization results.
2 Preliminaries
The set of natural numbers N denotes the universe of potential players. A coalition
is a non-empty finite subset of N and let N denote the set of all coalitions of N.
Given S, T ∈ N , we use S ⊂ T to indicate strict inclusion, that is, S ⊆ T and
S 6= T . By |S| we denote the cardinality of the coalition S ∈ N . A transferable
utility coalitional game is a pair (N, v) where N ∈ N is the set of players and v :
2N −→ R is the characteristic function that assigns to each coalition S ⊆ N a real
number v(S), representing what S can achieve by agreeing to cooperate, with the
convention that v(∅) = 0. Given a game (N, v), the dual game (N, vd) is defined
4 Previous axiomatic characterizations of the egalitarian non-separable contribution solution
can be found in Moulin (1985), Driessen and Funaki (1997) and Hwang (2006).
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by setting for all S ⊆ N , vd(S) = v(N)− v(N \S). For simplicity of notation, and
if no confusion arises, we write v(i), v(ij), . . . instead of v({i}), v({i, j}), . . .. By Γ
we denote the class of all games.
Given N ∈ N and ∅ 6= N ′ ⊆ N , the unanimity game (N,uN ′) associated to
N ′ is defined as uN ′(S) = 1 if N
′ ⊆ S and uN ′(S) = 0 otherwise. Given a game
(N, v) and ∅ 6= N ′ ⊂ N , the subgame (N ′, v|N ′) is defined as v|N ′(S) = v(S) for
all S ⊆ N ′. For any two games (N, v), (N,w), α ∈ R and d ∈ RN , we define the
game (N, v +w) as (v +w)(S) = v(S) +w(S), the game (N,α · v) as (α · v)(S) =
α · v(S) and the game (N, v + d) as (v + d)(S) = v(S) +
∑
i∈S di, for all S ⊆ N .
The null game (N,0) is defined by 0(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N .
Given N ∈ N , let RN stand for the space of real-valued vectors indexed by N ,
x = (xi)i∈N , and for all S ⊆ N , x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi, with the convention x(∅) = 0. For
each x ∈ RN and T ⊆ N , x|T denotes the restriction of x to T : x|T = (xi)i∈T ∈ RT .
Given two vectors x, y ∈ RN , x ≥ y if xi ≥ yi, for all i ∈ N , while x > y if xi > yi,
for all i ∈ N .
The set of feasible payoff vectors of (N, v) is defined by X∗(N, v) := {x ∈
RN |x(N) ≤ v(N)}, while the preimputation set contains the efficient payoff
vectors, that is, X(N, v) := {x ∈ RN |x(N) = v(N)}.
A solution on a class of games Γ ′ ⊆ Γ is a correspondence σ that associates
with each game (N, v) ∈ Γ ′ a subset σ(N, v) of X∗(N, v). Given a solution σ on
Γ ′ ⊆ Γ such that (N, v), (N, vd) ∈ Γ ′, the dual of σ, denoted by σd, is defined
by setting for all (N, v) ∈ Γ ′, σd(N, v) = σ(N, vd). A solution σ on Γ ′ ⊆ Γ
is said to be single-valued if |σ(N, v)| = 1 for all (N, v) ∈ Γ ′. In this case,
σ(N, v) is treated as the unique element of this singleton set. Notice that a single-
valued solution is always non-empty but not necessarily an efficient allocation.
We say that a single-valued solution σ on Γ ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies efficiency (E) if all
the gains from cooperation are shared among the players, that is, for all N ∈ N
and all (N, v) ∈ Γ ′, it holds
∑
i∈N σi(N, v) = v(N). Apart from efficiency, a
classical invariant requirement w.r.t. changes in scale that are comparable with
positive affine transformations is covariance. A single-valued solution σ on Γ ′ ⊆ Γ
satisfies covariance (CO) if for all N ∈ N , all (N, v) ∈ Γ ′, all α > 0 and
all d ∈ RN , if (N,α · v + d) ∈ Γ ′ then σ(N,α · v + d) = α · σ(N, v) + d. Two
players i and j are symmetric in a game (N, v) if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all
S ⊆ N \{i, j}. A single-valued solution σ on Γ ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies equal treatment of
equals (ETE) if for all N ∈ N , all (N, v) ∈ Γ ′ and all symmetric players i, j ∈ N ,
then σi(N, v) = σj(N, v).
On the dual of games Γ ′ ⊆ Γ that is closed under the duality operator, two
properties are dual to each other if whenever a solution σ satisfies one of them,
the dual solution σd satisfies the other. A property is self dual if it is dual to
itself. It is not difficult to check that efficiency, covariance and equal treatment of
equals are self dual.
For our purposes, we introduce some well-known efficient single-valued solu-
tions defined on Γ . Let N ∈ N and (N, v) ∈ Γ . The Shapley value, Sh, is defined





|S|! (|N | − |S| − 1)!




|T |−|S|v(S) for all ∅ 6= T ⊆ N . Then, we can express the game
(N, v) by a linear combination of the unanimity games as v =
∑
∅6=T⊆N αTuT . The
weighted Shapley value relative to a list of positive weights w = (wi)i∈N ∈ RN++,




αT · Shw(N,uT ),
where




if i ∈ T
0 if i ∈ N\T
.
Notice that when wi = wj for all i, j ∈ N, then Shw(N, v) = Sh(N, v).
Let N ∈ N and (N, v) ∈ Γ . The equal surplus division solution, ES, is
defined by






 for all i ∈ N.
The weighted surplus division solution relative to a list of positive weights
w = (wi)i∈N ∈ RN++, ESw, is defined by






 for all i ∈ N.
Given a list of positive weights w, ESw can be interpreted as a two-stage rule:
after assigning to every player what they can achieve for themselves alone, it
distributes what is left of the gains of cooperation proportionally according to w,
representing some exogenous abilities or bargaining power of the players. Notice
that when wi = wj for all i, j ∈ N, then ESw(N, v) = ES(N, v).
The dual solutions of ES and ESw are, respectively, the egalitarian non-
separable contribution solution, ENSC, and the weighted egalitarian non-
separable contribution solution, ENSCw. Let N ∈ N and (N, v) ∈ Γ . The
ENSC is defined by setting, for all i ∈ N ,







where Mj(v) = v(N) − v(N \ {j}), for all j ∈ N . The ENSCw relative a list of
positive weights w = (wi)i∈N ∈ RN++ is given, for all i ∈ N , by
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Let N ∈ N and (N, v) ∈ Γ . With any preimputation x ∈ X(N, v) we associate
the vector of all excesses e(S, x) = v(S) − x(S), ∅ 6= S ⊂ N , the components of
which are non-increasingly ordered. The prenucleolus, ν∗, is the preimputation
that minimizes with respect to the lexicographic order5 the vector of excesses over
the set of preimputations.
For the two-agent case, the weighted standard solution relative to a list
of positive weights w = (wi)i∈N ∈ RN++, STw, is defined as follows: for all N =
{i, j} ∈ N and all (N, v) ∈ Γ ,
STwi (N, v) := v(i) +
wi
wi + wj
(v(N)− v(i)− v(j)) ,
STwj (N, v) := v(j) +
wj
wi + wj
(v(N)− v(i)− v(j)) .
Many solutions in the literature coincide with the standard solution that
show up when all the players have the same weight.
Given a list of positive weights w ∈ RN++, we say that a single-valued solution
σ on Γ ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies w−proportionality (w−P) if for all N = {i, j} ∈ N and
all (N, v) ∈ Γ ′, it holds σ(N, v) = STw(N, v). If all weights are identical, we say
that σ satisfies standardness (ST).
3 Consistency and path monotonicity
The main concern of this section is to characterize the weighted surplus division
solution by means of consistency together with monotonicity and covariance. Inter-
estingly, our characterization result shows that, from an axiomatic point of view,
the consistency principle distinguishes the weighted surplus division solution, the
weighted Shapley value and the prenucleolus.
Consistency is a sort of internal stability requirement that relates the solution of
a game to the solution of a reduced game that results when some agents leave. The
different ways in which the agents that remain evaluate the possible coalitions give
rise to different notions of reduced game. Here we deal with four ways of reducing
a game: the self reduced game (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989), the projection
reduced game (Funaki, 1998), the complement reduced game (Moulin, 1985)
and the max reduced game (Davis and Maschler, 1965). The terminology is
taken from Thomson (2003).
Definition 1 Let σ be a single-valued solution, N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ Γ , and ∅ 6=











0 if R = ∅,
v(R ∪N \N ′)−
∑
i∈N\N ′
σi(R ∪N \N ′, v|R∪N\N ′ ) if ∅ 6= R ⊆ N ′.
5 Given two vectors x, y ∈ RN , we say that x ≤lex y if either x = y, or x1 < y1 or there
exists k ∈ {2, . . . , |N |} such that xi = yi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and xk < yk.
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Definition 2 Let N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ Γ , x ∈ RN and ∅ 6= N ′ ⊂ N. The projection











v(R) if R ⊂ N ′,
v(N)− x(N \N ′) if R = N ′.
Definition 3 Let N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ Γ , x ∈ RN and ∅ 6= N ′ ⊂ N. The com-












0 if R = ∅,
v(R ∪N \N ′)− x(N \N ′) if ∅ 6= R ⊆ N ′.
Definition 4 Let N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ Γ , x ∈ RN and ∅ 6= N ′ ⊂ N . The max











0 if R = ∅,
max
Q⊆N\N ′
{v(R ∪Q)− x(Q)} if ∅ 6= R ⊂ N ′,
v(N)− x(N \N ′) if R = N ′.
In the self reduced game (relative to N ′ at σ), the worth of a coalition R ⊆ N ′
is determined under the assumption that R joins all members of N \N ′, provided
they are paid according to σ in the subgame associated to R ∪ (N \ N ′). In the
projection reduced game (relative to N ′ at x), when players in N \ N ′ leave the
game, for a proper subcoalition R ⊂ N ′ cooperation is no longer possible with
them. By contrast, in the complement reduced game (relative to N ′ at x) each
coalition R ⊆ N ′ is required to join all the members of N \N ′, provided that they
are paid according to x. Finally, in the max reduced game (relative to N ′ at x),
the worth of a coalition R ⊂ N ′ is determined under the assumption that R can
choose the best partners in N \N ′, provided that they are paid according to x.
The following notions of consistency rely on the above definitions of reduced
game.
A single-valued solution σ on Γ ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies
– Self consistency (SC): if for all N ∈ N , all (N, v) ∈ Γ ′, all ∅ 6= N ′ ⊂ N and













– Projection consistency (PC): if for all N ∈ N , all (N, v) ∈ Γ ′, all ∅ 6= N ′ ⊂













– Complement consistency (CC): if for all N ∈ N , all (N, v) ∈ Γ ′, all ∅ 6=













– Max consistency (MC): if for all N ∈ N , all (N, v) ∈ Γ ′, all ∅ 6= N ′ ⊂ N,













The consistency principle states that in the corresponding reduced game the
original agreement should be confirmed. Funaki (1998) shows that projection con-
sistency and complement consistency are dual properties.
8 Pedro Calleja, Francesc Llerena
The next result links consistency with covariance (for two-person games) and
efficiency.
Proposition 1 Let σ be a single-valued solution on Γ that satisfies either pro-
jection consistency, complement consistency, self consistency or max consistency
and, for two-person games, covariance. Then, σ satisfies efficiency.
Proof Let σ be a single-valued solution on Γ that satisfies CO for two-person
games and PC. Let ({i, j},0) be the null game. Then, by CO (for two-person
games) we have σ({i, j},0) = σ({i, j}, 2 · 0) = 2 · σ({i, j},0) and, consequently,
σ({i, j},0) = (0, 0). Let ({i, j}, v) be a game such that v(ij) = v(i) + v(j). Then,
by CO (for two-person games) we have
σ({i, j}, v) = σ({i, j}, 1 ·0+(v(i), v(j)) = 1 ·σ({i, j},0)+(v(i), v(j)) = (v(i), v(j)).
(1)
Now, let ({i}, v) be a one-person game and, for some j ∈ N\{i}, consider the
game ({i, j}, v′) defined by v′(i) = v′(ij) = v(i) and v′(j) = 0. Since v′(ij) =
v′(i) + v′(j), from (1) it comes that σi({i, j}, v′) = v(i) and σj({i, j}, v′) = 0. It





being x = σ({i, j}, v′). By PC,
σ({i}, v) = v(i) which implies efficiency for one-person games. Let N ∈ N with









j∈N\{i} σj(N, v), where x = σ(N, v). By








The same arguments hold replacing PC by either CC, SC or MC. ut
Several notions of monotonicity have played a role in characterizing solutions
on different frameworks.6 In this section, we introduce a variant of aggregate mono-
tonicity (Megiddo, 1974), which states that nobody is worse off whenever the worth
of the grand coalition increases, while the worth of every other coalition remains
unchanged. By imposing some regularity in the way players share the extra profits
(loses) if only the worth of the grand coalition increases (decreases), we introduce
path monotonicity.




the following conditions: for all N ∈ N and all t ∈ R,
1. f(N, 0) = (0, . . . , 0) ∈ RN ,
2. f(N, t) ∈ RN and
∑
i∈N fi(N, t) = t,
3. if t′ ∈ R is such that t′ > t, then fi(N, t′) > fi(N, t) for all i ∈ N .
Notice that a monotone path assigns positive (negative) vectors to positive (neg-
ative) real numbers. Let Fmon denote the class of monotone paths.
A monotone path f specifies a complete list of monotonic agreements. We
assume that whenever a set of players N ∈ N reaches an agreement (which can be
6 See, for instance, Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975), Kalai (1977), Kalai and Samet (1985),
Young (1985) or Thomson (1987).
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different for different sets) on how to distribute monotonically an amount t ∈ R,
representing the difference of the worth of the grand coalitions between two games,
they will respect this agreement by following the same principle, regardless of the
games they eventually play.
The family Fmon is very rich. Possibly, the simplest monotone path is to con-
sider that all players should be treated equally: for all N ∈ N , all t ∈ R and all
i ∈ N ,
f̄i(N, t) =
t
|N | . (2)
However, path monotonicity allows for treating players differently to reflect some
individual abilities or exogenous circumstances among them (like income or health
status) that are not captured by the mathematical description of the game. For
instance, given a list of exogenous weights w ∈ RN++, define, for all N ∈ N , all
t ∈ R and all i ∈ N ,




A single-valued solution σ on Γ ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies
– Path monotonicity (P-MO): if there exists a monotone path f ∈ Fmon
such that, for all N ∈ N and all (N, v), (N, v′) ∈ Γ ′ with v(S) = v′(S) for all
S ⊂ N , it holds σ(N, v′)− σ(N, v) = f(N, v′(N)− v(N)).
Obviously, path monotonicity implies aggregate monotonicity, but the next ex-
ample shows that the reverse implication is not true.
Example 1 Define the single-valued solution ρ by setting, for all N ∈ N , all
(N, v) ∈ Γ and all i ∈ N ,
ρi(v) := v(i) +
|{j ∈ N | v(i) ≥ v(j)}|∑
k∈N






Clearly, ρ satisfies aggregate monotonicity. Assume that ρ also satisfies path mono-
tonicity w.r.t. f ∈ Fmon, and consider two games (N, v1) and (N, v2) with player
set N = {1, 2} and characteristic functions: v1(1) = v2(2) = 1, v1(2) = v2(1) = 0
and v1(N) = v2(N) = 2. Now define the associated games (N, (v1)′) and (N, (v2)′)
by (v1)′ = v1−uN and (v2)′ = v2−uN , respectively. Notice that, (a) ρ1(N, v1) =
5
3 , ρ1(N, (v
1)′) = 1 and (b) ρ1(N, v
2) = 13 , ρ1(N, (v
2)′) = 0. Then, from (a),
f1(N, 1) =
2
3 and, from (b), f1(N, 1) =
1
3 , resulting in a contradiction. Hence, ρ is
not path monotonic.
The Shapley value, the equal surplus division solution and the egalitarian non-
separable contribution solution satisfy path monotonicity (w.r.t. f̄). For any list
of positive weights w ∈ RN++, the weighted Shapley value and the weighted sur-
plus division solution also meet path monotonicity (w.r.t. fw). However, not all
weighted egalitarian non-separable contribution solution satisfies aggregate mono-
tonicity, and so path monotonicity. Let us provide an example to check this point.
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Example 2 Consider two games (N, v) and (N, v′) with set of players N = {1, 2, 3}
and characteristic functions as follow: v(S) = v′(S) for all S ⊂ N , v(i) = 0 for all
i ∈ N , v(12) = v(13) = 1, v(23) = 0, v(N) = 1 and v′(N) = 2. Let w ∈ RN++ be
a list of positive weights such that w1 = 3 and w2 = w3 = 1. A routine calculus










is not aggregate monotonic (and neither path monotonic).
Notice that, since ESw and ENSCw are dual to each other and ESw satisfies
path monotonicity, from Example 2 we may conclude that path monotonicity is
not self dual.
The next remark highlights that path monotonicity yields some structure on
the associated monotonic function f ∈ Fmon.
Remark 1 Interestingly, if σ is a single-valued solution on Γ satisfying path mono-
tonicity w.r.t f ∈ Fmon, then f is additive. That is, for all N ∈ N and all t, t′ ∈ R,
f(N, t + t′) = f(N, t) + f(N, t′). To show it, consider three games (N, v), (N, v′)
and (N, v′′) such that v(S) = v′(S) = v′′(S) for all S ⊂ N , v(N)− v′(N) = t and
v′(N)− v′′(N) = t′. By path monotonicity, we have
f(N, t+ t′) = f(N, v(N)− v′′(N)) = σ(N, v)− σ(N, v′′)
= σ(N, v)− σ(N, v′) + σ(N, v′)− σ(N, v′′)
= f(N, v(N)− v′(N)) + f(N, v′(N)− v′′(N))
= f(N, t) + f(N, t′).
Moreover, if an additive function g : R → R is monotonic, then there exists a
constant k ∈ R such that g(x) = k · x for all x ∈ R (see, for instance, Theorem 2.1
in Jung, 2011). Hence, there exist k1, . . . , kn ∈ R such that, for all N ∈ N and all
α, t ∈ R, f(N,α · t) = (k1 · α · t, . . . , kn · α · t) = α · (k1 · t, . . . , kn · t) = α · f(N, t).
Consequently, f ∈ Fmon is homogeneous.
The next two lemmas are important to prove an intermediate result showing
that imposing, for two-person games, covariance and path monotonicity, consis-
tency enables us to generate endogenously a collection of positive weights.
Lemma 1 Let σ be a single-valued solution on Γ that satisfies, for two-person
games, covariance and path monotonicity. Then, for all {i, j} ∈ N it holds
(i) σ({i, j}, u{i,j}) > (0, 0).
(ii) σ({i, j}, u{i,j}) = −σ({i, j},−u{i,j}).
Proof Let σ be a single-valued solution on Γ that satisfies CO and P-MO for two-
person games. Let N = {i, j} and consider the associated unanimity game (N,uN ).
By P-MO (for two-person games), there exists a monotone path f ∈ Fmon such
that σ(N,uN ) = σ(N,0) + f(N, 1). Similarly, σ(N,−uN ) = σ(N,0) + f(N,−1).
By CO (for two-person games), σ(N,0) = (0, 0) (see expression (1) in Proposition
1) and thus σ(N,uN ) = f(N, 1) and σ(N,−uN ) = f(N,−1). Hence, σ(N,uN ) >
(0, 0) which proves (i). Moreover, since f is homogeneous (see Remark 1) we have
σ(N,uN ) + σ(N,−uN ) = f(N, 1) + f(N,−1) = (0, 0), which proves (ii). ut
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Lemma 2 Let σ be a single-valued solution on Γ that satisfies, for two-person
games, covariance and path monotonicity. Let N ∈ N with |N | = 3. Then, for all
k, s ∈ N ,












(ii) if σ satisfies max consistency, it holds
σk(N,uN )− r{k,s}M,x (uN )(k)










where x = σ(N,uN ).
Proof Let σ be a single-valued solution on Γ that satisfies, for two-person games,
CO and P-MO.
(i) If σ satisfies PC, let N ∈ N with |N | = 3 and denote x = σ (N,uN ).
For all pairs of agents k, s ∈ N , by PC it holds that
σ|{k,s}(N,uN ) = σ
(
{k, s}, r{k,s}P,x (uN )
)
.
Let α = r
{k,s}
P,x (uN )(ks). By the definition of projection reduced game,
r
{k,s}
P,x (uN ) = α · u{k,s}.
If α > 0, by CO (for two-person games) it follows
σ
(
{k, s}, r{k,s}P,x (uN )
)





If α = 0, as in the proof of Proposition 1 we have
σ
(
{k, s}, r{k,s}P,x (uN )
)
= (0, 0).
























where the second equality holds by CO (for two-person games) and the last
one by Lemma 1 (ii). Thus,
σ|{k,s}(N,uN ) = σ
(


















> (0, 0), which implies that σk(N,uN )
and σs(N,uN ) have the same sign. By Proposition 1, σ satisfies E, then∑
i∈N σi (N,uN ) = 1 and thus σi (N,uN ) > 0 for all i ∈ N . Finally, from
(6) it follows (4).
The same arguments hold replacing PC by SC.
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(ii) If σ satisfies MC, let N ∈ N with |N | = 3 and denote x = σ (N,uN ).
For all pairs of agents k, s ∈ N , by MC it holds that
σ|{k,s}(N,uN ) = σ
(
{k, s}, r{k,s}M,x (uN )
)
.
Let α = r
{k,s}
M,x (uN )(ks) − r
{k,s}
M,x (uN )(k) − r
{k,s}













If α > 0, by CO (for two-person games) it follows
σ
(















If α = 0, as in the proof of Proposition 1 we have
σ
(



























































where the second equality holds by CO (for two-person games) and the last
one by Lemma 1 (ii). Thus,
σ|{k,s}(N,uN ) = σ
(






M,x (uN )(ks)− r
{k,s}






















> (0, 0), which implies
Sign
(









σk(N,uN )− r{k,s}M,x (uN )(k) 6= 0. (9)
Suppose, on the contrary, σk(N,uN ) − r{k,s}M,x (uN )(k) = 0. Then, by equality
(8), σs(N,uN )− r{k,s}M,x (uN )(s) = 0. Consequently,
σk(N,uN ) = r
{k,s}
M,x (uN )(k) = max{0, 0− σl (N,uN )} ≥ 0,
σs(N,uN ) = r
{k,s}
M,x (uN )(s) = max{0, 0− σl (N,uN )} ≥ 0,
(10)
being l ∈ N \ {k, s}. Thus,
σk(N,uN ) = σs(N,uN ) ≥ 0. (11)
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Now consider the max reduced game
(
{k, l}, r{k,l}M,x (uN )
)
relative to {k, l} at
x = σ (N,uN ). From (11) it follows that
r
{k,l}
M,x (uN )(k) = r
{k,l}
M,x (uN )(l) = 0 and r
{k,l}
M,x (uN )(kl) = 1− σs (N,uN ) .
By MC and, for two-person games, P-MO and CO (from which it follows
expression (1) in the proof of Proposition 1), there is a monotone path f ∈
Fmon such that
σ|{k,l}(N,uN ) = σ
(
{k, l}, r{k,l}M,x (uN )
)
= σ ({k, l},0) + f ({k, l}, 1− σs (N,uN ))
= f ({k, l}, 1− σs (N,uN )) .
(12)
Since f ∈ Fmon and, by (11), σk(N,uN ) ≥ 0, we have 1 − σs (N,uN ) ≥ 0.
Consequently, σl(N,uN ) = fl ({k, l}, 1− σs (N,uN )) ≥ 0. By expression (10),
this means that σk(N,uN ) = σs(N,uN ) = 0 and by E (see Proposition 1),
σl(N,uN ) = 1. Then, σl(N,uN )− r{k,l}M,x (uN )(l) = 1− 0 = 1. Since expression
(8) holds for any pair of agents, we have σk(N,uN ) − r{k,l}M,x (uN )(k) > 0, in
contradiction with σk(N,uN ) = 0. This proves the claim, that is, inequality
(9). But then, from (7) it follows (5). ut
Next, we connect consistency, covariance and path monotonicity with w−pro-
portionality.
Proposition 2 Let σ be a single-valued solution on Γ that satisfies either projec-
tion consistency, self consistency or max consistency and, for two-person games,
covariance and path monotonicity. Then, σ satisfies w-proportionality.
Proof Let σ be a single-valued solution on Γ that satisfies PC and, for two-person
games, CO and P-MO. By Proposition 1, σ satisfies E. Next we see that σ satisfies
w−P w.r.t. the following collection of weights: fix a player l ∈ N and define
wk =





By Lemma 1 (i), w is well defined.
Let (N, v) be a game. If N = {i}, by E we have σ({i}, v) = v(i) + wiwi (v(i) −
v(i)) = ESw({i}, v). If |N | = 2 we distinguish two cases:
1. Case 1: N = {l, i}.
Let us denote α = v(N)− v(l)− v(i).
If α = 0, then by CO (for two-person games) (see expression (1) in the proof
of Proposition 1) we have σ(N, v) = (v(l), v(i)) = STw(N, v).
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If α > 0, then for all k ∈ N , we have
σk(N, v) = σk(N,α · uN + (v(l), v(i)))
= α · σk (N,uN ) + v(k)
= α · σk (N,uN )





1 + σi(N,uN )σl(N,uN )
+ v(k)
= α · wk
wl + wi
+ v(k)
= STwk (N, v)
where the second and the third equalities follow by CO (for two-person games)
and E, respectively.
If α < 0, notice first that v = −α · (−uN )+(v(l), v(i)). By CO (for two-person
games) and Lemma 1 (ii), σ(N, v) = α ·σ (N,uN )+(v(l), v(i)). Now, following
the reasoning above we obtain σk(N, v) = ST
w
k (N, v), for all k ∈ N .
2. Case 2: N = {i, j} and l /∈ N .






















































= σj({i, j}, u{i,j}). (14)
Let us denote α = v(N)− v(i)− v(j).
If α > 0, then CO (for two-person games) together with (13) imply
σi(N, v) = σi(N,α · uN + (v(i), v(j)))
= α · σi(N,uN ) + v(i)
= α · wi
wi + wj
+ v(i)
= STwi (N, v).
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In a similar way, CO (for two-person games) together with (14) imply
σj(N, v) = ST
w
j (N, v).
If α ≤ 0, the reasoning used in Case 1 applies in this case. Consequently, σ
satisfies w−P.
The same arguments hold replacing PC by SC or PC by MC and taking into
account Lemma 2 (ii). ut
From Proposition 2 it turns out that the weighted surplus division solution and
the family of weighted Shapley values can be compared by means of consistency
together with covariance and path monotonicity.
Theorem 1 Let σ be a single-valued solution on Γ that satisfies covariance and
path monotonicity. Then,
(i) σ satisfies projection consistency if and only if there exists a list of positive
weights w ∈ RN++ such that σ = ESw.
(ii) σ satisfies self consistency if and only if there exists a list of positive weights
w ∈ RN++ such that σ = Shw.
Proof
(i) Let w ∈ RN++ be a list of positive weights. Clearly, ESw satisfies CO and P-
MO (w.r.t. the monotone path fw as defined in (3)). Moreover, Calleja and
Llerena (2016) show that it also satisfies PC.
To prove uniqueness, suppose there is a single-valued solution σ on Γ satisfying
these three properties. By Propositions 1 and 2, σ satisfies E and w−P (w.r.t
a list of positive weights w ∈ RN++). Let (N, v) be a game. If |N | = 1, by E we
have σ(N, v) = ESw(N, v). If |N | = 2, by w−P we have σ(N, v) = ESw(N, v).
Finally, if |N | ≥ 3, fix i ∈ N and take an arbitrary j ∈ N\{i}. Let N ′ =
{i, j} ⊂ N , then,


















(σi(N, v) + σj(N, v)− v(i)− v(j)) ,
where the first equality follows by PC, the second one by w−P and the def-



















(σj(N, v)− v(j)) ,
or, equivalently,
(σi(N, v)− v(i))wj = (σj(N, v)− v(j))wi.
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(σj(N, v)− v(j)) ,













where the last equality follows from E. Hence,









= ESwi (N, v).
(ii) Let w ∈ RN++ be a list of positive weights. It is well known that Shw satisfies SC
and CO. In addition, it also satisfies P-MO (w.r.t. the monotone path fw as
defined in (3)). Uniqueness comes from Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) (Theorem
C) taking into account that P-MO implies monotonicity (by condition (3) in
Definition 5) and CO together with SC imply E (by Proposition 1).7 ut
It is well known that the prenucleolus does not satisfy aggregate monotonic-
ity8 (and thus path monotonicity). However, imposing this property for two-person
games only, we obtain a new characterization of the prenucleolus using max con-
sistency.
Theorem 2 The prenucleolus is the unique single-valued solution on Γ that sat-
isfies max consistency, covariance and, for two-person games, path monotonicity.
Proof It is well-known that ν∗ satisfies MC, CO and ST, which implies P-MO
(w.r.t. the monotone path f̄ as defined in (2)) for two-person games.
To prove uniqueness, suppose there is a single-valued solution σ on Γ satisfying
these three properties. By propositions 1 and 2, σ satisfies E and w−P. From
Hokari (2005) (Proposition 1), E, w−P and MC jointly imply ST. Finally, since
MC and ST imply ETE, by Orshan (1993) (Theorem 3.2) it follows that σ
coincides with ν∗. ut
Remark 2 The characterizations (and the independence of the properties) stated
in Theorem 1 hold if we impose path monotonicity and covariance for two-person
games only. Thus, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 allow for a comparison of the family
of weighted Shapley values, the family of weighted surplus division solutions and
7 In Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) monotonicity means that everybody is strictly better off
whenever the worth of the grand coalition increases and the worth of every other coalition
remains unchanged. Notice that monotonicity is a strong version of aggregate monotonicity
and weaker that path monotonicity.
8 See, for instance, Hokari (2000).
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the prenucleolus by means of consistency. Notice that, although with projection
consistency or self consistency together with covariance and path monotonicity
(for two-person games) a large family of solutions is characterized, when working
with max consistency we obtain only the prenucleolus (not the family of weighted
prenucleoli).9 The key result is provided by Hokari (2005), who shows that ef-
ficiency, w-proportionality and max consistency enforce indeed standardness and
thus equal treatment of equals.
Formally, axiomatizations that require some properties for two-person games
only are more compelling than those that impose the properties meet for games
with an arbitrary number of players. However, axiomatizations that do not force
any initial condition for two-person games reflect more accurately the normative
behaviour of the solutions. In fact, sometimes we get impossibility results when the
properties are required over the full domain of games (see Theorem 5 in Section
4).
4 Consistency and fairness
By using fairness, a property due to van den Brink (2001) and related to fairness
as introduced by Myerson (1977), instead of path monotonicity, we obtain a new
axiomatic comparison of the Shapley value, the equal surplus division solution,
the egalitarian non-separable contribution solution and the prenucleolus.
A single-valued solution σ on Γ ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies
– Fairness (F): if for all (N, v), (N, v′) ∈ Γ ′ with (N, v + v′) ∈ Γ ′ and i, j ∈ N
such that i and j are symmetric in (N, v′) we have σi(N, v + v
′)− σi(N, v) =
σj(N, v + v
′)− σj(N, v).
Fairness means that if a game changes by adding another game in which two
players i and j are symmetric, then the payoffs of players i and j change by the
same amount. If we measure the relevance of a player in terms of marginality,
fairness is a quite natural requirement since adding such a game does not change
the marginal contributions of symmetric players. Making use of this property,
van den Brink (2001) and Casajus (2014) characterize the Shapley value. Not
surprisingly, efficiency together with fairness imply path monotonicity. It is not
difficult to check that fairness is a self dual property.
Proposition 3 Let σ be a single-valued solution on Γ that satisfies efficiency and
fairness. Then, σ satisfies path monotonicity.
Proof Let σ be a single-valued solution on Γ that satisfies E and F. Let N ∈ N ,
t ∈ R and consider two games (N, v), (N, v′) such that v(S) = v′(S) for all S ⊂ N
and v′(N)− v(N) = t. Notice that v′ = v+ t · uN . Since all players are symmetric
in the game (N, t · uN ), by F we have σi(N, v′)− σi(N, v) = σj(N, v′)− σj(N, v)
9 For a formal definition of weighted prenucleoli see, for instance, Derks and Haller (1999).
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for all i, j ∈ N . Finally, by E we obtain σi(N, v′) − σi(N, v) = t|N| for all i ∈ N .
Hence, σ satisfies P-MO (w.r.t. the monotone path f̄ as defined in (2)). ut
Proposition 3 shows that, under efficiency, path monotonicity can be viewed
as a relaxation of fairness by allowing that when the worth of the grand coalition
varies, the players’ payoffs change in the same direction, but not necessarily by the
same amount, as fairness suggests. Now, replacing path monotonicity by fairness
in Theorem 1, we obtain new axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley value
and the equal surplus division solution. Moreover, imposing complement consis-
tency we provide a new axiomatic characterization of the egalitarian non-separable
contribution solution.
Theorem 3 Let σ be a single-valued solution on Γ that satisfies covariance and
fairness. Then,
(i) σ satisfies projection consistency if and only if it coincides with the equal sur-
plus division solution.
(ii) σ satisfies self consistency if and only if it coincides with the Shapley value.
(iii) σ satisfies complement consistency if and only if it coincides with the egalitarian
non-separable contribution solution.
Proof
(i) It is clear that the equal surplus division solution satisfies PC, F and CO.
Let σ be a single-valued solution on Γ that satisfies these three properties. By
Proposition 1 and Proposition 3, σ obeys E and P-MO (w.r.t. the monotone
path f̄). Now uniqueness comes following the proof of Theorem 1 (i) taking
into account that all players have the same weight.
(ii) It is well known that the Shapley value satisfies SC, F and CO. Let σ be a
single-valued solution on Γ that satisfies these three properties. By Proposition
1 and Proposition 3, σ obeys E and P-MO (w.r.t. the monotone path f̄). It
is not difficult to check that CO, E and P-MO (w.r.t. f̄) imply ST. Now
uniqueness comes from Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) (Theorem B).
(iii) Clearly, the egalitarian non-separable contribution solution satisfies CC, F and
CO. Let σ be a single-valued solution on Γ satisfying these three properties.
The dual solution σd satisfies PC, F and CO since CC and PC are dual to
each other and CO and F are self dual properties. Thus, by statement (i),
σd = ES. In view of the fact that the egalitarian non-separable contribution
solution is dual to the equal surplus division solution, we conclude that σ =
ENSC. ut
Since the prenucleolus satisfies fairness for two-person games (because it satis-
fies standarness), from Proposition 1, Proposition 3 and Theorem 2 we obtain an
alternative characterization.
Theorem 4 The prenucleolus is the unique single-valued solution on Γ that sat-
isfies max consistency, covariance and, for two-person games, fairness.
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Remark 3 The characterizations stated in Theorem 3 hold if we impose fairness for
two-person games only. Thus, Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 allow for a comparison of
the Shapley value, the equal surplus division solution, the egalitarian non-separable
contribution solution and the prenucleolus by means of consistency.
Since the prenucleolus does not satisfy neither path monotonicity nor fairness
(see Proposition 3) for games with an arbitrary number of players, two impossi-
bility results emerge from both Theorem 2 and Theorem 4.
Theorem 5 There is no single-valued solution on Γ that satisfies
(i) max consistency, covariance and path monotonicity.
(ii) max consistency, covariance and fairness.
5 Concluding remarks
Theorem C in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) characterizes the family of weighted
Shapley values by means of self consistency and, for two-person games, efficiency,
covariance and monotonicity. Nevertheless, from Proposition 1 it comes out that
efficiency can be dropped from their characterization result. Thus, it can be refor-
mulated as follows:
Theorem 6 A single-valued solution σ on Γ satisfies self consistency and, for
two-person games, covariance and monotonicity if and only if there exists a list of
positive weights w ∈ R++ such that σ = Shw.
This reformulation opens an interesting question: which is the set of rules
that emerges from substituting in Theorem 6 self consistency by either projection
consistency, complement consistency or max consistency? Notice that we partially
overcome this problem working with path monotonicity. Unfortunately, we have
been unsuccessful in our attempts to solve this problem using monotonicity as
defined in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), and we leave it for future research.
It is well known that efficiency, covariance and equal treatment of equals for
two-person games are equivalent to standardness. The Shapley value, the equal
surplus division solution and the egalitarian non-separable contribution solution
satisfy these properties for any game. Moreover, covariance only for two-person
games together with either self consistency, projection consistency or complement
consistency imply efficiency (Proposition 1). Consequently, Theorem B’ in Hart
and Mas-Colell (1989) can be reformulated (dropping efficiency) in terms of co-
variance and equal treatment of equals for two-person games, together with self
consistency. Moreover, Corollary 4.4. (i) in Driessen and Funaki (1997) can be
rewritten by means of covariance and equal treatment of equals together with pro-
jection consistency, dropping efficiency too. Finally, the egalitarian non-separable
contribution solution can be characterized by means of covariance, equal treat-
ment of equals and complement consistency, which is also a refinement of Corollary
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4.4. (ii) in Driessen and Funaki (1997).10 Interestingly, Sobolev (1975) character-
izes the prenucleolus as the unique single-valued solution that satisfies covariance,
anonymity11 and max consistency. Orshan (1993) shows that anonymity can be
weakened and replaced by equal treatment of equals. Theorem 2, Theorem 3 and
Theorem 4 modify, respectively, these characterizations replacing equal treatment
of equals by path monotonicity/fairness (for two-person games). It is not difficult
to check that path monotonicity/fairness neither imply equal treatment of equals
nor they are implied by it.
As underlined in Section 3, not all weighted egalitarian non-separable contribu-
tion solution, ENSCw, satisfy aggregate monotonicity (see Example 2). Therefore,
complement consistency, covariance and path monotonicity do not characterize the
family of ENSCw. However, for any list of positive weights, the ENSCw meets
path monotonicity for two-person games.12 In view of Theorem 2, one may wonder
if complement consistency, covariance and, for two-person games, path monotonic-
ity, characterize the family of ENSCw. At this point some difficulties appear.
First, as the next example shows, ENSCw does not satisfy w-proportionality. Let
(N, v) be a game with N = {1, 2}, v(1) = 1, v(2) = 0, v(N) = 2 and consider















. Thus, Proposition 2 does not hold when imposing comple-
ment consistency. If we want to use the duality approach from Theorem 1(i) (and
taking into account Remark 2), a second drawback is that path monotonicity for
two-person games is neither self dual. To see it, consider the single-valued solution
% defined, for all N ∈ N and all (N, v) ∈ Γ , as follows:
%(N, v) :=
{





if N = {i, j}.
Notice that % satisfies path monotonicity (w.r.f. f̄ as defined in (2)).
The dual solution %d is given by setting, for all N ∈ N and all (N, v) ∈ Γ ,
%d(N, v) :=
{






if N = {i, j}.
Let (N, v), (N, v′) be two games with set of players N = {1, 2} and characteristic








and %d(N, v′) = (3,−1), which proves that %d is not aggregate
monotonic, and hence path monotonicity is not self dual for two-person games.
Thus, in future research it could be interesting to pay attention to this issue.
Nevertheless, a characterization of the family of weighted non-separable contri-
bution solutions can be derived introducing the dual property of path monotonicity.
10 In Driessen and Funaki (1997), efficiency is included in their definition of single-valued
solution.
11 In words, anonymity simply says that the solution is independent of the names of the
players (see Peleg and Sudhölter, 2007, for a formal definition).
12 Let w ∈ RN++. It can be easily checked that ENSCw satisfies, for two-person games, path
monotonicity w.r.t. a monotone path gw ∈ Fmon such that, for all N = {i, j} ∈ N and all
t ∈ R, gwi (N, t) =
wj
wi+wj
· t and gwj (N, t) =
wi
wi+wj
· t. Notice that gw 6= fw as defined in (3).
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A single-valued solution σ on Γ ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies
– Constant shift path monotonicity:13 if there exists a monotone path f ∈
Fmon such that, for all N ∈ N and all (N, v), (N, v′) ∈ Γ ′ with v′(N)−v(N) =
v′(S)−v(S) for all ∅ 6= S ⊂ N , it holds σ(N, v′)−σ(N, v) = f(N, v′(N)−v(N)).
Constant shift path monotonicity says that if the impact in the game (N, v) is
such that all coalitions increase (decrease) in the same amount t and players agree
on how to distribute it, then they should respect this agreement regardless of the
initial game (N, v). It is not difficult to check that constant shift path monotonicity
and path monotonicity are dual to each other. This fact, together with Theorem 1
(i), lead to the following characterization result.
Theorem 7 A single-valued solution σ on Γ satisfies complement consistency,
covariance and constant shift path monotonicity if and only if there exists a list of
positive weights w ∈ RN++ such that σ = ENSCw.
To finish, a quite natural question is to study the implications of considering
weakly monotonic functions rather than strictly monotonic functions in the defi-
nition of a monotone path (Definition 5). It turns out that imposing “weak” path
monotonicity in Theorem 1 (i) and (ii) provides larger classes of single-valued so-
lutions than ESw and Shw that include, for instance, any marginal contribution
solution and any fπ- surplus division solution (see Appendix for formal defini-
tions), respectively. On the other hand, the single-valued solution introduced by
Peleg and Sudhöter (2007) (see Section 6.3.2. p.118) satisfies, on the domain of
balanced games,14 covariance, max consistency and, for two-person games, “weak”
path monotonicity. Consequently, on balanced games, imposing “weak” path mono-
tonicity in Theorem 2 does not characterize the prenucleolus. This may suggest
that, on the full domain of games, Theorem 2 does not remain valid when working
with this weaker form of path monotonicity, although it is still an open question.
In our opinion, dealing with such problems may require a good understanding of
weighted solutions and properties when zero weights are allowed, in the line of
the works of Kalai and Samet (1987), Monderer, Samet and Shapley (1992) or
Nowak and Radzik (1995) for the weighted Shapley values, or Hokari (2005) for
the prenucleolus.
Appendix
This appendix contains the independence of the properties used in the charac-
terization results. To do this, let us first introduce the following single-valued
solutions:
13 We thank an anonymous referee for providing us this property.
14 A game (N, v) is said to be balanced if C(N, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v)|x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆
N} 6= ∅.
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1. The equal divison solution, denoted by ED, is defined as follows: for all





2. Let π be a permutation on N, the marginal contribution solution relative
to π, denoted by mcπ, is defined as follows: for all N ∈ N , all (N, v) ∈ Γ and
all i ∈ N
mcπi (N, v) := v ({j ∈ N |π(j) ≤ π(i)})− v ({j ∈ N |π(j) < π(i)}) .
3. Let π be a permutation on N, the fπ−surplus division solution, denoted
by ESf
π
, is defined as follows: for all N ∈ N , all (N, v) ∈ Γ and all i ∈ N ,
ESf
π










where fπ is defined as follows: for all t ∈ R, fπ(N, t) = t · e{j}, being j ∈ N
such that π(j) ≥ π(i) for all i ∈ N . fπ assigns all the amount t to the last
player in N according to π.




satisfies covariance and projection consistency but, for two-person games,
neither monotonicity (and thus path monotonicity) nor fairness. The dual so-
lution of ESf
π
satisfies covariance and complement consistency but neither
fairness nor constant shift path monotonicity. Sh satisfies covariance, path
monotonicity, constant shift path monotonicity and fairness but neither projec-
tion consistency nor complement consistency. ED satisfies path monotonicity,
constant shift path monotonicity, fairness, projection consistency, complement
consistency and self consistency but not covariance for two-person games. Ad-
ditionally, the marginal contribution solution, mcπ, satisfies covariance and self
consistency but, for two-person games, neither monotonicity nor fairness. ES
satisfies covariance, path monotonicity and fairness but not self consistency.
– Independence of the properties in Theorem 2 and Theorem 4:
ED satisfies max consistency, path monotonicity and fairness, but not covari-
ance. ES satisfies path monotonicity, fairness and covariance, but not max
consistency. Finally, to find a single-valued solution satisfying max consistency
and covariance but, for two-person games, neither path monotonicity nor fair-
ness, see Lemma 6.3.15 in Peleg and Sudhölter (2007).
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